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ABSTRACT
Drawing from a social constructionist theoretical orientation,
and a range of congenial practices, we propose the concept of
transformative dialogue which stresses relational responsibil-
ity, self-expression, affirmation, coordination. refley"Hty7^^
the co-cr^!ion ofnew realities. We see conversationanftoj^es
that accomplish these aims as highly promising; at the same
time there is no attempt in the present article to suggest these
as ultimate solutions to employ in situations of conflict. The
present is an attempt to generate a potentially useful
vocabulary rather than a strict set of rules for negotiating
among incommensurate realities.
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TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE DIALOGUE
Try to see it my way...
While you see it your way...
We can work it out.
We can work it out
The Beatles
Most of us feel more comfortable in certain groups than others, and
indeed find certain people just plain wrong headed or evil—perhaps neo-
Nazis, the KKK, the Mafia, terrorist groups. This sense of alterity—
distance or separation from particular others—is virtually an inevitable
outcome of social life. The reahties and moralities we come to inhabit are
those that gain support and viability in significant sets of relationships. As
we come to generate realities and moralities within specific groups—
families, friendships, the workplace, the religious setting—so do our
interlocutors become invaluable resources for sustaining those realities.
With their support—either exphcit or implicit—we gain the sense of who we
are, what is real, and what is right. At the same time, all world constructions
and their associated forms of relational life create a devalued exterior—a
realm that is not us, not what we believe, not true, not good. This
devaluation derives from the structure of language out of which we
construct our realities. Language is essentially a differentiating medium,
with every word separating that which is named or indicated from that
which is not (absent, contrary). Thus, whenever we declare what is the case
or what is good, we use words that privilege certain existents while thrusting
the absent and the contrary to the margins. An emphasis on the material
basis of reality suppresses or devalues the spiritual; an emphasis on the
world as observed subtlety undermines beliefs in the unseen and intuitive,
focus on our problems diverts our attention from what is working, and so
on. In effect, for every reality there is alterity.
The problem of difference is intensified by several anc i l^^ tendencies.
First, there ^^JenderTcyTomoid those~MnT-ar^iffslSKf7"and particularly
when they seem antagonistic to one's way of life. We avoid meetings,
conversations, and social gatherings. With less opportunity for interchange,
there is secondly a tendency for accounts of the other to become simplified.
There are few challenges to one's descriptions and explanations; fewer
exceptions are made. Third, with the continuing tendency to explain others'
actions in a negative way, there is a movement toward extremity. As we
continue to locate "the evil" in the other's actions, there is an accumulation;
slowly the other takes on the shape of the inferior, the stupid or the
villainous. Social psychologists often speak in this context of "negative
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stereotyping," that is, rigid and simplified conceptions of the other. All such
tendencies lead to social atomization, with the same processes that separate
cliques and gangs in adolescence reflected organizationally as tensions
between management and workers or hne and staff; and at the societal level
as conflicts between the pohtical left and right, fundamentalists vs. hberals,
gay rights and anti-gays, and pro-choice vs. pro-life. And more globally we
find similar tendencies separating Jews and Palestinians, Irish Catholics vs.
Protestants, Muslims vs. Christians, and so on.
On this account tendencies toward division and conflict are normal
outgrowths of social interchange. Prejudice is not, then, a manifestation of
flawed character—inner rigidities, decomposed cognition, emotional biases,
and the like. Rather, so long as we continue the normal process of creating
consensus around what is real and good, classes of the undesirable are under
production. Wherever there are tendencies toward unity, cohesion,
brotherhood, commitment, solidarity, or community, so are the seeds of
alterity and conflict sewn. In the present condition, virtually none of us
escapes from being undesirable to at least one (and probably many) other
groups. The major challenge that confronts us, then, is not that of generating
warm and cozy communities, conflict-free societies, or a harmonious world
order. Rather, given the endemic character of conflict, how do we proceed in
such a way that ever emerging antagonism does not yield aggression,
oppression, or genocide—in effect, the end of meaning altogether. This
chaltenge is all the more daunting in a world where communication
technology allows increasing numbers of groups to organize, mold common
identities, set agendas and take action.^'^ Perhaps the major challenge for the
21st century is how we shall manage to live together on the globe.
What resources are available to us in confronting this challenge? At
least one important possibihty is suggested by the social constructionist
posture that frames the above account: if it is through dialogue that the
grounds for conflict emerge, then dialogue may be our best option for
treating contentious reahties. Yet, in spite of the broad significance attached
to the term, "dialogue," little is gained by invoking its power. More
formally, dialogue is simply "a conversation between two or more persons."
And indeed, it is ultimately impossible to distinguish between dialogue and
its other, namely monologue. For even monologue is addressed to
someone—either present or implied. And even should the recipient remain
silent, responses do occur—privately to one's interlocutor or more publicly
to concerned others. Sampson*^^ distinguishes dialogue from monologue not
on the basis of two vs. one participant. He describes monologue as a
conversational domain where one participant constructs the other to meet
his or her needs and desires. Similarly, Shotter says in dialogue, " . . .we bring
out the nature of what we do, our practices by comparison with what others
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(actual or invented) do, or don't do."^ "*^  To make significant headway here it
seems essential to distinguish among specific forms of dialogue. We prefer to
abandon the dialogue/monologue distinction and recognize instead forms
of dialogue that foster "ways of going on together," ways of coordinating
activities as opposed to discursive forms that foster alienation, hostility, and
violence. Not all dialogic processes are useful in reducing the potential for
hostihty, conflict, and aggression. Indeed conversations dominated by
critical exchanges, saber ratthng, and contentious demands may only
exacerbate the conflict. It is in this context that we wish to put forth the
concept and practice of transformative dialogue. Transformative dialogue
may be viewed as any form of interchange that succeeds in transforming a
relationship between those committed to otherwise separate and antag-
onistic realities (and their related practices) to one in which common and
solidifying realities are under construction.
REALIST/RATIONALIST R£S0UilCES AND
THEm "^'
Here's to you, and here's to me
And if we two should disagree.
To hell with you!
Traditional toast
To appreciate what is at stake here let us briefly consider several
existing orientations to dialogue relevant to the challenge of alterity.^ ^^
Broadly speaking, these orientations are lodged within the twin traditions of
reahsm and rationalism. That is, on the rationalist side they tend to view
persons as independent actors, ideally reasoning their way toward
identifiable goals; on the side of realism, they tend to posit a single existing
reaUty (or structure of rewards, punishments, payoffs). Ideally it should
be possible, from these perspectives, to locate a single best logic (rational
procedure) for resolving differences between competing parties. Most
extreme in these respects is the argumentation orientation. Here "the
discussants must advance statements in which the standpoint under
discussion is attacked and defended... In an argumentative discussion the
participants try to convince one another of the acceptability or unaccept-
ability of the expressed opinion under discussion by m^ns of argumentative
statements. These are designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion to
the listener's satisfaction."* '^ Specific rules of argumentation are thus
designed for broadest (and potentially universal) application. Perhaps the
clearest exemplar of the argiunentation orientation at work is the judicial
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process. It is easy to see that within the argumentation orientation, one
"side" will "win the argument" and the rationahty of the winner's reality is
the ground upon which the winner is selected.
Under less formalized circumstances, but sharing much with
argumentation theory, we find the bargaining orientation. As one bargaining
impresario puts it, because of the common "clashing of preferences" among
parties, "Bargaining is a search for advantage through accommodation."^^'
In the bargaining domain, the emphasis on logic is manifest in discussions of
optimal bargaining strategies (minimizing loss while maximizing gain).
Using the logic of limiting constraints and maximized potentials, what
counts as reasonable depends on the rationality (and thus the "truth") of
one party's preferences over the other's. For example, potentials and
consequences of using reward as opposed to punishment or threat strategies
are deliberated. By exploiting the adversary's weaknesses, the hope is to
achieve the greatest advantage while conceding as httle as possible. The
bargaining orientation is typically applied to circumscribed but intense
conflicts in business and pohtical arenas.
Third, while sustaining the emphasis on independent adversaries, the
negotiation orientation tends to shift focus from the mini-max strategies
generally championed in bargaining, to a concern with maximum joint
reward ("satisficing"). In such best sellers as Getting to Yes and Getting Past
No, Roger Fisher and William Ury'*' outline strategies by which each party
to the negotiation may generate "options for mutual gain." The parties are
encouraged to identify their basic interests, what they want from the
negotiation and how important it is for them. With these interests in view,
participants are encouraged to search for those particular interests shared in
common, or ways of dovetailing otherwise different interests, and then
inventing solutions that both can find acceptable. Negotiation practices are
most often found in business and government contexts where there has not
been longstanding antagonism. Again, we see an overriding emphasis on a
merging of two or more individual rationalities into one mutually acceptable
solution.
Although overlapping substantially with negotiation, we may justifi-
ably separate out the mediation orientation^^^ for its stronger emphasis on
diminishing distance between the participants. Here a major emphasis is
typically placed on replacing adversarial, distributive bargaining, with
collaborative, integrative problem solving. Some also wish to use mediation
practices to help individuals develop their capacities for self-determination
and to foster social justice. Parties may be encouraged to listen to and
understand each other's thoughts and feelings about the situation, to
generate multipte options, and to work together to locate a mutually
agreeable option. Mediation of this sort is often useful in cases of
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interpersonal conflict, such as divorce or child custody. Yet, like the other
approaches raised here, the mediation orientation begins with a notion of
the rational and the real as individual possessions which, in this case, simply
need to be understood and respected.
However, from a social constructionist standpoint both the rational
and the real are byproducts of communal relations. In the case of reason,
constructionists see all rational arguments, strategic reasoning, or rules of
rational deliberation as historically and culturally situated. While there are
surely conventions of "good reason" about which many people in Western
society agree, any fixed standard or requirement will always remove the
privilege of meaningful participation from some person or group. Further,
by solidifying such standards or requirements, we diminish the possibihty of
new alternatives (for example substituting for "rational talk" some form of
non-verbal interchange). This is simply to say that rationality, from a social
constructionist orientation, recognizes the conventions as constructions that
do not necessarily apply to all person in all relationships in all situations
or historical moments. Thus, the conversation is left open to alternative
possibilities.
In the case of realism, constructionists hold all that is taken to be real
(e.g. "the problem," "my interests," "the optimal solution") as essentially
moves in discourse, a discourse that is credible only for certain people
at certain times, and which is both ambiguous and flexible. Thus, to fix "the
problem," "my interests," and the like is to establish ontological limits
within which the dialogue can proceed. If we agree that "this is the
problem," then by common convention we shall move toward "solution
talk." If we establish "your interests" as opposed to "mine," we discourage
discourses of "rights," "duties," "justice," "the spirit," and so on. In effect,
we truncate the possibilities for the mutual construction of the real.
This latter limitation is exacerbated by a further presumption shared
by the existing traditions. For the constructionist the conception of persons
as independent individuals is also a historical and cultural artifact. By
dividing the arena into separate, autonomous individuals, each with private
interests, perceptions and reasons we already limit the possibilities for
dialogue. The limitation in this case may be of no small consequence, as the
assumption of fundamental difference also implies an unbreachable alterity.
In spite of temporary agreements, the other will always be alien, unknown,
and fundamentally untrustworthy. In effect, at the heart of the individualist
view is a world of "all against all." As we shall find, other conceptions of
persons are possible, and some of these may have more promising potentials
for transformative dialogue. In sum, we may here agree with David Bohm's
comment on dialogue, "If it is necessary to share meaning and share truth,
then we have to do something different."*'*"
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STEPS TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIONIST ALTERNATIVE
Given the problems inhering in realist/rationalist orientations to
dialogue, what alternatives are suggested by social constructionism? Here it
must first be pointed out that there are no principles or practices that strictly
derive from social constructionist accounts of knowledge or relationships.
Words or phrases do not in themselves necessitate or dictate any course
of action. Nor does constructionism attempt to abandon and replace the
existing orientations. Rather, from a constructionist standpoint all forms of
discourse and practice may be intelligible and functional within particular
socio-historical circumstances. Argumentation, bargaining, negotiation, and
mediation may all function effectively within circumscribed contexts.
However, if we do recognize world conditions in which multiple realities
and rationahties are ever increasingly articulated and disseminated, we also
become sensitized to the limits of any particular tradition.
With these considerations at hand, in the present offering we propose
the following: First, rather than working "top down"—with high level
authorities or abstract systems laying out the rules, ethics or practices for
all — let us proceed "bottom up." That is, let us move to the world of
action, and specifically to cases in which people seem to be wrestling
successfully with problems of multiple and conflicting realities, and doing so
without strong commitment to either rationalist or realist premises. By
examining these cases we may be able to locate conversational actions or
conditions that have broad transformative potential. Second, we shall
attempt to provide a theoretical rationale for these effects. This will enable
us not only to glimpse possible reasons for their eflicacy, but will invite us to
consider other forms of action that could function similarly, or other
contexts to which these practices could be adapted. Third, by expanding
both theory and context in this way we can open inquiry on possibly
important ingredients of tranformative dialogue absent from the initial
family. And finally, to expand the arena of considerations, we shall turn to
metaphor. Specifically, if we use the metaphor of jazz improvisation, what
new insights can be garnered on the nature of transformative dialogue?
Our aim, then is not that of erecting overarching rules for
transformative dialogue or a set of necessary procedures. Rather, the hope
is to foster a vocabulary of relevant action along with a way of deliberdting on
its functions and translation into other practices. In other words, consistent
with the constructionist premise that we create our worlds in what we do
together, we attempt here to offer several conversational resources that can
be called upon not as techniques (because they are rational or real) but as
fluid and supple resources for action. To that end, the resources/actions we
offer will take on new and transformative meanings as they are joined with
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the situated actions of others. We envision, for example, that on any given
occasion one might 1) draw from this vocabulary as useful for the
conditions at hand, or 2) employ the theoretical resources for generative
purposes. This is scarcely to etch this particular vocabulary in stone, for as
meanings are transformed over time, and as further voices are added to the
conversation, the vocabulary itself will be altered and augmented. There are
no universal rules for transformative dialogue, for diatogue itself will alter
the character of transformative utility.
A TOUCHSTONE RESOURCE: THE PUBLIC
CONVERSATION PROJECT
To begin, let us first consider a single successful case. We can then step
back to examine some of its features and ponder their implications. In 1989
Laura and Richard Chasin, Sallyann Roth and their colleagues at the Public
Conversations Project in Watertown, Massachusetts, began to apply skills
developed in the context of family therapy to stalemated public con-
troversies.^"' Their practice has evolved over the years and with impressive
results. Here we may focus on their attempt to bring together committed
activists on opposing sides of the abortion conflict. More generally this is a
case in which public debate has lead nowhere, largely because the opponents
construct reality and morality in entirely different ways. The stakes are high,
there is enormous animosity, and the consequences are lethal.
In the present case, activists who were wiUing to discuss the issues with
their opponents were brought together in small groups. The Project
directors spent a good deal of time, prior to the discussion, talking with
participants to clarify ground rules and the goals of the conversation. In
doing so, they guaranteed the participants that they would not have to
participate in any activity which they found uncomfortable. The meeting
began with a buffet dinner, in which the participants were asked to share
various aspects of their lives other than their stand on the abortion issue.
After dinner the facilitator invited the participants into "a different kind of
conversation" and reiterated the ground rules and objectives of their
discussion. Participants were asked to speak as unique individuals—
expressing their own experiences and ideas—rather than speak as
representatives of a position, to share their thoughts and feelings, and to
ask questions about which they were curious. As the session began, the
participants were asked to respond—each in turn and without interrup-
tion—to three major questions. The questions were asked one at a time
giving each participant as much time to respond as needed and thus giving
everyone the opportunity to hear each others' answers to the question on the
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floor before moving on to the next. The questions asked were elegant in their
simplicity: (1) How did you get involved with this issue? What's your
personal relationship, or personal history with it? (2) We'd like to hear a
little more about your particular beliefs and perspectives about the issues
surrounding abortion. What is at the heart of the matter for you? (3) Many
people we've talked to have told us that within their approach to this issue
they find some gray areas, some dilemmas about their own beliefs or even
some conflicts. Do you experience any pockets of uncertainty or lesser
certainty, any concerns, value conflicts, or mixed feelings that you may have
and wish to share?
Answers to the first question typically yielded a variety of personal
experiences, often stories of the participants' lives or the experiences of loved
ones. The second question gave participants an opportunity to offer their
"public stance" on the issue. However, it is important to note that the
potential for these public positions to be heard differently is increased.
Because the first question asked participants to focus on their personal
stories vis a vis the issue of abortion, their public stance took on a new
tenor, now placed in relationship to the personal narrative. Through this
unique conversational process, participants revealed many doubts when
responding to the third question and found themselves surprised to learn
that people on the other side have uncertainties as well.
After addressing the three questions, participants were given an
opportunity to ask questions of each other. They were advised not to pose
questions that "are challenges in disguise," but to ask questions "about which
you are genuinely curious... We'd like to learn about your own personal
experiences and individual beliefs..." After discussing a wide range of issues
important to the participants, there was a final discussion of what the
participants felt they had done to "make the conversation go as it has."
Follow-up phone calls a few weeks after each session revealed significant,
positive effects. Participants felt they left with a more complex understanding
of the struggle, and a significantly re-humanized view of "the other." No, they
did not change their fundamental views, but they no longer saw the issues in
such black and white terms nor those who disagreed as demons.
TOWARD A VOCABULARY OF TRANSFORMATIVE
The work of the Public Conversations Project is indeed impressive and
has lead to many additional ventures and variants. However, the question
we must now confront is, what particular features of this kind of dialogue
make it so effective? How can we conceptualize these components such that
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they can be appropriated and their variants extended into other contexts?
We cannot use precisely these practices in all situations of conflict or
difference, but if we can abstract from these practices we have a means of
deliberating on how we might proceed elsewhere. And too, we should be
sensitive to absences within the practice; what might a constructionist
standpoint suggest in terms of augmentation? Let us then focus on six
prominent components of special relevance to transformative dialogue.
From Blame to Relational Respoflsibility
We have only one person to blame, and that's each other.
Barry Beck, New York Ranger
(after a brawl at the championship playoffs)
Many significant hurdles to transformative dialogue reside in our
traditions of interchange, for example, presumptions of a single truth,
universal logic, winning and losing. There is another daunting problem that
grows from the individualist view of persons as agents of their own actions:
we have a pervasive culturat tendency to hotd peopte moratly accountable
for what they do. We construct persons as originary sources of their own
actions (moral agents), and thus responsible for their misdeeds. There is
much about the tradition of individual responsibility that most of us greatly
value. The discourse of individual blame allows us to hold persons
accountable for robbery, rape, murder and the like. By the same token,
we are able to praise individuals for singutar achievements, humanitarian
and heroic acts, etc. Would we have it any other way?
Yet, as we have outlined elsewhere*'^' this same discourse of individual
blame is divisive. In finding fault with another, we begin to erect a wall
between us. In blaming, I position myself as all-knowing and all-righteous,
and you as a flawed being who is subject to my judgment. You are
constructed as an object of scorn, subject to correction, while I remain
praiseworthy and powerful. In this way I ahenate you, and in the Western
tradition, hostility is a normal response. The problem is intensified in the case
of antagonistic groups, for each may hold the other responsible—the poor
will blame the wealthy for exploitation, while the wealthy will hold the poor
responsible for their indolence; the conservative will blame the homosexual
for corrupting the society, while the homosexual will blame the conservative
for intolerance, and so on. Thus, each finds the guilty other not only denying
guilt but, without any justification whatsoever, attempting to reverse the
blame. Antagonisms are further polarized, and the tradition of individual
btame thus sabotages the process of transformative dialogue.
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It is in this context that we may appreciate the potentials of relational
responsibility. If all that we take to be true and good has its origin in
relationships, and specifically the process of jointly constructing meaning,
then there is reason for us all to honor—to be responsible to—relationships of
meaning making themselves. The quest, then, is for means of sustaining
processes of communication in which meaning is never frozen or terminated,
but remains in a continuous state of becoming. Obviously, mutual blame is an
impediment to relational responsibility. How, then, can relational responsi-
bility be achieved in practice, and particularly in cases of mutual blame? In the
case of the Public Conversations Project, the tendency toward blame was
simply defined out of bounds. The conversational tasks did not permit blame
talk, not even disguised as questions. Under normal circumstances, however,
we scarcely have control over the rules of conversation. How can one shift
from individual blame to a more relationally responsible language in daily life?
Although there are no definitive answers to such a question, again we can
locate in the culture's practices several means of shifting the conversation
away from individual blame. Consider:
Internal Others
If I talk too much and too loud and you are drowned out of the
conversation, you have good reason for blaming me. However, if you attack
me directly, our relationship may be cooled. One option is to locate within
me another voice that is "speaking me" in the situation. If you say, for
example, "The way you are talking, I wonder if your father isn't present
with you tonight..." or "You are really sounding very much like that
teacher of yours..." In effect, you communicate your displeasure, but I am
positioned to evaluate my actions as something other than "myself." What
we take to be the "core self is not placed on the defense.
Conjoint Relations
If in the heat of argument you insult me, I may justifiably blame you
for your abuse and our relationship will suffer. However, I may also be able
to locate ways in which it is not you, in particular, who is to blame, but our
particular pattern of relating. It is not you vs. me, but we who have created
the action in question. Remarks such as, "Look what we are now doing to
each other...," "How did we get ourselves into this situation..." or "We are
killing ourselves going on like this; why don't we start from the beginning
and have a different kind of conversation..." all have the effect of replacing
guilty individuals with a sense of interdependent relationship.
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Group Realities
Alice finds Ted so irritating; he is messy, never picks up after himself,
thinks only of his needs, seldom listens to her; Ted can scarcely tolerate
Alice's pristine tidiness, her disinterest in his job, and her way of prattling
on. They are seething in blame for each other. Yet, there is another
vocabulary of possibility here, one that may shift the form and direction of
conversation. Specifically, there is way of seeing ourselves not as singular
individuals but as representatives of groups, traditions, families and so on.
We may avoid the habit of individual fault finding in the context of group
differences. For example, if Ted and Alice could speak about gender
differences, and trace their proclivities to an origin in different gender
traditions, they might move into a space of more congenial conversation. If
we move the discussion to focus on group difl"erences, individual blame
recedes in importance.
The Systemic Swim
When Timothy McVeigh was found guilty of blowing up the
Oklahoma City Federal building and taking scores of lives, he was
sentenced to death. There is a sense of collective relief; justice was done.
Back to work. Yet, consider again the logic of the Militia Movement of
which McVeigh was part. The national government, from their perspective,
is destroying the American tradition, trampling on their rights, and forcing
them into poverty. Justice will be done when they destroy this malevolent
force. In effect, the same logic underlies both McVeigh's crime and our
reactions to it. Or to put it another way, there is an important sense in which
McVeigh's crime was an extension of the very tradition that most of us
support and sustain. This is not to forgive the crime. However, it is to say
that the voice of individual blame is insufficient. Another voice may be
added usefully to the conversation in which we broaden our concerns to the
ways in which we participate as a society in creating the conditions for most
of what we devalue. It takes more than a village to create a rape, a hate
crime, or a robbery.
The S%riicwM» of Setf-ExpFessdon
If we can successfully avoid blame, how can we move dialogue in the
direction of change? The Public Conversation Project work suggests that
self-expression may be vital. Participants in their conversations were each
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given ample opportunity to share views that were important to them. In part
the importance of self-expression can be traced to the Western tradition of
individualism. As participants in this tradition, we believe we possess inner
thoughts and feelings and that these are essential to who we are; they
virtually define us. Thus, if dialogue is to proceed successfully, it is critical
that one's voice is heard. To paraphrase the logic "If my position—what I
truly think and feel—is not voiced, there is no dialogue."
Yet, the self-expressions encouraged by the Public Conversations
Project are of a very special kind. They asked the participants to speak
personally as opposed to using abstract arguments, to tell stories of their
own involvement in the issue of abortion. There are at least three reasons
that such expressions are desirable for transformative dialogue. First, and
most simply, they are easily comprehensible; from our earliest years we are
exposed to the narrative form common in personal storyteUing, and we are
more fully prepared to understand this form as opposed to abstract
arguments. Further, stories can invite fuller audience engagement than can
abstract ideas. In hearing stories we generate images, thrive on the drama,
suffer and celebrate with the speaker. Finally, the personal story tends to
generate acceptance as opposed to resistance. If it is "your story, your
experience," then I can scarcely say "you are wrong." However, if you
confront me with an abstract principle, our common traditions of
argumentation prepare me for resistance. By flailing me with a principle,
you set yourself as a mini-god, issuing commandments from on high. My
resentment will trigger a fusillade of abstract statements that you will find
equally alien. "Who are you to tell me that a fertilized egg, detected only
microscopically, has a 'right to life?' " "And who are you to tell me that a
woman has a right to murder a child in the making?" At this juncture the
conversation is effectively terminated. Personal stories, on the other hand,
open way for a different dialogue.
Affirming the Other
It is one thing to relate one's feehngs or hfe experiences; however it is
quite another to gain a sense of the other's affirmation. Because meaning is
bom in relationship an individual's expression does not acquire full
significance until supplemented. If you fail to appreciate what I am saying,
or I think you are distorting my story, then I have not truly expressed
anything. Affirmation of the other imphes locating something within the
other's expression to which we can lend our agreement and support. Such
affirmation is important in part for reasons deriving from the individualist
tradition and the presumption that thoughts and feelings are individual
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possessions. As we say, " / experience the world in these ways," or "These
are my beliefs." If you challenge or threaten these expressions you place my
being into question; in contrast, to affirm is to grant worth, to honor the
validity of my subjectivity. Second, as one's realities are discounted or
discredited so are the relationships from which they derive. If you as reader
dismiss social constructionism as absurd, and argue that we should give it
up, so are you asking us to sever an enormous range of relationships. To
embrace an idea is to embrace new relationships, and to abandon one is to
undermine one's community.
Yet, how can affirmation be achieved when people live in oppositional
realities? How can they affirm each other when they do not agree? The work of
the Public Conversations Project is informative here. The conversations were
effectively staged so as to promote forms of appreciation. Curiosity was invited
and hstener appreciation was facilitated through the other's telling of stories,
many of which were also touching. To "be moved" is a high form of affirmation.
Sympathetic attention may be a significant step toward affirmation. Similarty,
in her volume. Conversation, Language, and PossUnUties, Harlene Anderson
speaks for many change agents when she proposes that therapy becomes
transformative when, "the therapist enters the therapy domain with a genuine
posture and manner characterized by an openness to another person's
ideological base—his or her reality, betiefs, and experiences. This tistening
posture and manner invotve showing respect for, having humility toward, and
believing that what a client has to say is worth hearing."^''*' Of course, the
possibilities for transformation may be enhanced when the affirmation moves
from concerted attention to actual agreement. It isn't essential in this case that
one agree with all that is said; support or delight in some aspect of the other's
expression may be sufficient. If you praise my intentions but find my arguments
wrong-headed, our conversation wilt proceed far more productively than if you
simply condemn my entire expression.
Coordinating Action: Invitation to
In our view one of the most important contributions to the success of
the Public Conversations Project derives from the fact that the meetings
began with a shared meal. At the outset the participants exchanged
greetings, smiles, handshakes. They began to converse in an unprogrammed
and spontaneous way about many things—children, jobs, tastes, and so on.
They developed rhythms of conversation, eye contact and simultaneous
eating as estabhshing a platform for the conversations that followed. In our
view transformative dialogue may thrive on just such efforts toward mutual
coordination. This is primarily because meaning making is a form of
TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE DIALOGUE 693
coordinated action. Thus, if we are to generate meaning together, we must
devetop smooth and reiterative patterns of interchange—a dance in which
we move harmoniousty together.
Yet, coordinating actions is not itself sufficient. Not ati patterns of
mutual action are favorable to transformative dialogue, and distinctions are
required. Consider first two forms of coordination that are not favored:
First, there is what we may call thanatopic (terminal) coordination, that is
coordination that leads to the death of meaning. For example, hostile
arguments and armed warfare are well coordinated actions, but such
interdependencies conduce toward division and mutual annihilation. In the
same way, as discussants in a dialogue each pick apart the other's ideas,
finding fault, demonstrating the superiority of their own position, they are
working thanatopically. When such forms of coordination are extended to
their logical conclusion the other is eradicated; or, in eifect, there is no one
else with whom to generate meaning. Thus all meaning, all articulations of
the real and the good, come to an end. Also problematic is a second form
of coordination we may term, sedimented. Here the participants are not
moving in such a way that the other's voice will ultimately be eliminated.
Rather, the patterns of reiteration are born of longstanding interchange;
they are steadfast and secure. The result, however, is a freezing of meaning.
There is little possibility for deviation or transformation. Many public
rituals exemplify sedimented coordination, as do traditional relationships
between patients and doctors, salesmen and buyers, toll collectors and
drivers. In each case the patterns of interdependence are so deeply ingrained
that there is little room for negotiation.
For present purposes, the most important form of coordination may
be termed, co-constituting. Here one person's moves in the conversation will
validate, affirm or reflect the other's moves. One's actions or utterances will
help to constitute the other's actions in their own terms, and in so doing,
also re-constitute oneself. This does not mean duplicating or agreeing fully
with what the other has done or said. Rather, one's actions will be a partial,
provisional, and ambiguous reverberation of the other, reflecting the other
in oneself. In effect the other is aligned more fully with oneself. Perhaps
the most common form of co-constituting coordination takes the form of
metonymic reflection. Metonymy refers to the use of a fragment to stand for
a whole to which it is related. Thus, "the golden arches" are used to signify
the McDonald's restaurants, or the British flag to indicate the United
Kingdom. In the present case, metonymic reflection occurs when one's
actions contain some fragment of the other's actions, a piece that represents
the whole. If I express to you doubts about my parents' love for me, and you
respond by asking, "What's the weather report for tomorrow?" you have
failed to include my being in your reply. If your response includes the sense
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of what I have said, possibly concern over what I have said, then I find
myself in you; I locate the "me" who has just spoken. At the same time,
because it is you who have generated this expression, it is not quite mine.
You have become partially me. You move us closer, and in doing so,
effectively you invite me to reply metonymically to you. Transformative
dialogue, then, may depend importantly on locating ourselves within each.
Let us consider two other forms of co-constituting coordination:
Coordinating Rhythm
Friends were vacationing in Jamaica and took their baby boy along
with them to a brunch that featured a local band. They found themselves in
dismay when, in the middle of a rousing performance, their baby began to
whale loudly. With deep embarrassment they began searching for an
available exit. However, the musicians had another idea. They began an
intricate reshaping of their rhythms so that they were soon incorporating the
child's cries. The music and the crying became one. The audience was
ecstatic. This reshaping exemplifies co-constituting coordination; with deft
and unpredicted movements the ill-fitting and disruptive becomes integrated
into the process of making meaning.
Although the band's actions represent a literal coordination of rhythm,
it is useful to open the term "rhythm" to a broader usage. Let us include here
any form of action that is formed so as to amplify or extend the existence of
another. On the simplest level, to respond to a smile with a smile (as opposed to
a blank stare), to adopt the other's tone of voice, to express in one's clothing
something of the formahty or informahty of the other style, for example,
would all be co-constituting coordination. Such moves can be contrasted with
rhythms that are thanatopic in effect. For example, in replacing warmth with
cool, shrill with calm, or physical distance with proximity, one is acting in
concert with the other, drawing on connections based on contrasts that "go
together." However, the actions don't so much resonate with the preceding as
negate them. In any case, the point of improvisation here is to secure a
mutuality of rhythm by means of which conversational participants may move
closer, to share a space from which a new building forth may proceed.
Coordinating Discourse
If we construct the world in entirely different terms, it is difficult to locate
grounds for co-creating meaning. However, there are means of moving toward
mutuality in language, including the use of similar phrasings, cadences, or tone
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of voice. One of the most interesting routes toward mutuality of discourse is
through what we may call semiotic shading, that is the substitution of a word
(or phrase) with a near equivalent, for example, "attraction" for "love,"
"irritation" for "anger," "tension" for "antagonism." The potentials of
shading are enormous, for every substitution of terms also brings with it an
array of different associations, new ranges of meaning, and fresh conversa-
tional openings. To say that there is "tension between us," (as opposed to
"antagonism") is to reduce the degree of implied hostility, and to replace it
with a sense of being in a state that one wishes to reduce. There are virtually no
limits, other than practical, to the possibihties of shading. At the extreme, any
term may have infinite possibilities for meaning—even to the point of
signifying its opposite. For example, if "love" can be "intense attraction,"
"intense attraction" can be an "obsession," and an "obsession" can be "a
sickness"—with the other now serving as "the source of my illness." Of course,
the source of one's illness is "undesirable," and something that is
"undesirable" is "not hked;" what is "not liked" is "hated." Thus, when its
implications are fully extended, to love is to hate.
In this light consider again the challenge of co-constituting coordina-
tion. If all statements are defeasible, that is, not themselves fixed in their
meaning, then they are open to semiotic shadings that can transform them into
something else. In effect, oppositional statements are only so by virtue of the
particular stance adopted within a conversation. Everything that is said could
be otherwise, and with appropriate shading could be brought into a state more
resembling what is otherwise eschewed. On a more practical level, with
appropriate shading the most antagonistic arguments can be remolded in such
a way as to allow an exploration of mutual interests. You may oppose
someone who favors the death penalty for cold blooded killers. However, if
"favoring the death penalty" can also mean, for example, a "radical measure
against heinous crime," chances are you could agree that radical measures"
are sometimes necessary. In such agreement you move toward commonality.
In sum, co-constituting coordination is not at attempt to pin down
precisely what is meant, to lock it in place, but rather to sustain a mutually
supportive interchange that is without a necessary terminus. It is in co-
constituting coordination that we locate the possibihty for the conversation
to move from the sedimented to the synergistic, from the conventional to the
catalytic, from the nascent to the novel.
Self-Reflexivity: The Promise of Polyvocality
One unfortunate aspect of traditional conversation is that we are
positioned as unified egos. That is, we are constructed as singular, coherent
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selves, not fragmented and multiple. To be incoherent is subject to ridicule,
moral inconsistency is grounds for scorn. Thus, as we encounter people
whose positions differ from ours, we tend to represent ourselves one-
dimensionally, ensuring that all our statements form a unified, seamless web.
As a result, when we enter a relationship defined by our differences,
commitment to unity will maintain our distance. And if the integrity or
validity of one's coherent front is threatened by the other, we may move
toward polarizing combat.
The transformative challenge in this case is to shift the conversation in
the direction of self-refiexivity—or a questioning of the otherwise coherent
self. In deliberating on our stand, we must necessarily adopt a different
voice, one that calls the dominant voice into question. Thus, in self
questioning, we relinquish the "stand fast and firm" posture of conflict, and
open possibilities for other conversations to take place. In Baxter and
Montgomery's*^' terms, we demonstrate one of the most important dialogic
skills, namely the "ability to recognize multiple, simultaneously salient
*'^ '
Such self-refiection is made possible by the fact that we are seldom
participants in only a single, reahty-making nucleus. We participate in
multiple relationships—in the community, on the job, at leisure, vicariously
with television figures—and we carry with us myriad traces of these
relationships. In a Bakhtinian sense we are polyvocal; we can speak with
many voices. For example, with effort we can typically locate reason to
doubt virtually any proposition we otherwise hold as true, and see
limitations in any value we think central to our life. Suppressed at the
moment I "speak my mind," or "say what I beheve" is the chorus of internal
nay-sayers. If these suppressed voices can be located and brought forth
within the conversation of differences, we move toward transformation.
In the case of the Public Conversations Project, self-reflexivity was
built in as a conversational requirement. After the opportunity to tell their
stories, participants were asked about possible "gray areas" in their behefs,
pockets of uncertainty, or mixed feelings. As participants spoke of their
doubts, animosities seemed to soften. Such reflections on the part of one
participant seemed to encourage a similar response in others. Possibilities
were opened for other conversations to take place than defending differences
largely due to the earlier expression of personal stories followed by ela-
boration on participants' public positions.
More broadly speaking, seli"-reflexivity may be only one member of a
family of moves that will inject polyvocality into the dialogue. For example,
in their conflict work, Pearce and Littlejohn*'*' often employ "third person
listening," in which one member of an antagonistic group may be asked to
step out of the conversation and to observe the interchange. By moving
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from the first person position, in whicti one is representing a position, to a
ttiird person stance, one can observe ttie conflict witti other criteria at hand
(e.g. "Is this a productive form of interaction?" "What improvements might
be made?")- In other conflict work, participants have found it useful to
make sahent the opinions or beliefs of groups that difl'er from both the
antagonists. Thus, for example, a conflict between two religious groups (e.g.
Christians vs. Mushms) takes on entirely difl'erent character when many
alternative regions are made salient (e.g. Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism).
In a similar vein, Harlene Anderson"' invites consulting teams to talk "as
if" they are different members of the client system and in so doing, the
consultants give voice to the multiplicity of positions.
The Co-creation of New Worlds
The Public Conversations Project is a generative source for both
illustrating and pondering the nature of transformative dialogue. However,
there is one significant way in which it does not take us far enough. As
outlined earlier, transformative dialogue is essentialty aimed at facilitating
the collaborative construction of new realities. Although the Project does
much to soften the antagonisms between conflicting parties, there is far
less emphasis on collaborative construction of alternatives. None of the
components thus far discussed actively promotes the conjoint construction
of the real or the good (and, in fact, the Public Conversation Project
explicitly stays away from policy formation or movement toward the
construction of something new). Needed in the dialogue are what might be
called imaginary moments in which participants join in developing new
visions of a reality. These imaginary moments not only sow the seeds for co-
construction, but also shift the position of the participants from combative
to cooperative. As participants move toward common purpose, so do they
redefine the other, and lay the groundwork for a conception of "us."
Perhaps the simplest way of moving toward a conjoint reality is
through locating what conflict specialists call superordinate goals. That is,
antagonists temporarily suspend their diflFerences to join in an eflbrt they
both support. For example, battling spouses may turn in unison on an
intruding do-gooder, or feminist radicals and conservative traditionalists
may join in a crusade against pornography. Or more broadly, there is
nothing so unifying for a country than to be threatened by invasion. In
terms of practice, much of the negotiation and mediation literature does
place a strong emphasis on locating mutually acceptable options—solutions
that enable each participant to obtain (at least partially) certain desired
ends. Yet, from a constructionist perspective, "desired ends" are not fixed
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tendencies to which the process of dialogue must accommodate, but rather
constructions embedded within discursive communities—including the
community created by the dialogue itself. Thus, the challenge is not so
much to consider the future in terms of fixed starting points (e.g. "my
needs," "my desires"), but through dialogue to construct a viable future
together. This is not to rule out the investments with which one enters the
exchange, but to focus on the potentials of the dialogue to reveal new,
unifying amalgamations of perspective.
One of the most impressive practices of conjoining realities—termed
appreciative inquiry—has been developed by organizational specialist, David
Cooperrider,^'^' and his colleagues at Case Western Reserve University. The
emphasis on appreciation sprang from the conception of "the appreciative
eye" in art, where it is said that within every piece of art one may locate
beauty. Is it possible, Cooperrider asked, that within every organization—
no matter how embroiled in conflict—one may locate beauty? And if beauty
can be found, can organizational members use it as a basis for envisioning a
new future?
The specific means of fostering appreciation draws from the
constructionist emphasis on narrative. People carry with them many stories,
and within this repertoire they can typically locate stories of value,
wonderment and joy. Within an organization these stories are valuable
resources, almost like money in the bank. To draw them out, to place them
in motion, proposes Cooperrider, is also to sow the seeds for alternative
visions of the future. And in listening to these stories confidence is
stimulated that indeed the vision can be realized. In effect, they set loose the
powers of creative change.
A single example will convey the potential of appreciative inquiry.
Acme Farm Equipment, as we shall call it, suffered from gender conflict.
Women in the company felt poorly treated by the males, seldom acknowl-
edged, sometimes harassed, underpaid and overworked. At the same time,
their male counterparts felt unfairly blamed, and blamed the women
employees for being unnecessarily touchy and hostile. Distrust was rampant,
there was talk of litigation, and the company began to falter.
The Acme executives then asked Cooperrider and his associates for
help. In particular, the executives felt, there should be a code of good
conduct, a set of rules specifying appropriate conduct for all parties, along
with penalties for misconduct. Yet, for Cooperrider this orientation simply
objectified "the problem," and such a "solution" would still leave a strong
residue of distrust. An appreciative inquiry was thus carried out in which
small groups of men and women employees met together; their specific
challenge was to recall some of the good experiences shared within the
company. Were there cases where men and women worked very well
TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE DIALOGUE 699
together, had been eflective and mutually regarding; were there times when
men and women had especially benefit from each other's contributions;
what were these experiences Uke and what did they mean to them as
employees? The employees responded enthusiastically to the challenge and
numerous stories were recalled about past successes. The groups then shared
and compared their stories. As they did so a discernible change began to
take place: the animosities began to melt; there was laughter, praise, and
mutual regard. In this positive climate, Cooperrider then challenged the
employees to begin to envision the future of the company. How could they
create together the kind of organization in which the experiences they most
valued would be central? How could they make the organization the kind of
place that could bring them this kind of joy? As the organizational members
began their discussion of the future, they also began to think of new
practices—policies, committees, social planning, and the Uke. Optimism and
a high sense of morale prevailed. "The problem" drifted into obscurity.
The practice of appreciative inquiry provides an excellent means by
which people can move toward the generation of new realities. By sharing
stories of value, commonalities are located. And using the sense of shared
value, visions are fostered. Dialogue is then employed to fill out the
landscape of the vision, to create a sense of a new reality, which, in turn, lays
the groundwork for alternative forms of action. At the same time,
the participants move from a divisive, "we" vs. "them" orientation, to a
conception of a "we." In effect, they simultaneously construct a new unit in
which they exist together.
LESSONS FROM JAZZ: A CASE ILLUSTRATION
One clear example of a social collectivity designed to support conjoint
relations leading to transformative dialogue is a jazz band. In jazz bands,
improvised enactments are coordinated by ongoing negotiation and fluid
interactions, rather than a written musical score. Unlike classical musicians
who play from a prescribed script, jazz players assume relational
responsibility for the emergence of their music.
Jazz players generate meaning together by supporting the development
of one another's contribution: through iterative patterns of exchange, each
person takes a turn developing a musical idea. In fact, good jazz improvisation
is often likened to a good conversation: players are in a continual dialogical
exchange with one another. Improvisers enter a flow of ongoing invention, a
combination of accents, cymbal crashes, changing harmonic patterns, that
inter-weave throughout the structure of the song. They are engaged with
continual streams of activity: interpreting others' playing, anticipating based
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on harmonic patterns and rhythmic conventions, while simultaneously
attempting to shape their own creations and relate them to what they have
heard. While one person is developing an idea, others take on a support role by
accompanying, or "comping." The task of those "comping" is to focus on
helping the other develop her emerging idea, to empathize with the soloist,
anticipate the direction of her phrases so as to blend, encourage, and augment.
Within this dialogical context, musicians feel free to try out different
perspectives without holding one another morally accountable for shifting
positions. Saxaphonist John Coltrane, for example, often experimented with
playing in odd, uncomfortable keys, playing songs with strange non-
sequential chord changes or building a solo based on the pentatonic (five
note) scale rather than the familiar western seven note major scale. Given
the relational support of an empathic quartet, he was able to avoid the
temptation of identifying with familiar, well rehearsed routines to the
exclusion of other new possibihties, often for the mere joy of discovering
what it would feel like to play from an alternative perspective.
"Improvisation" comes from the Latin "improvisus," meaning "not
seen ahead of time." The goal of improvisation is to create new material
without knowing in advance what will emerge. Since musicians improvise on
the spot without benefit of rehearsal, past successes and comfortable
routines are inadequate guides. However, all past performances become
possible resources. The unique aspect of the relational context (who is
playing, where they are playing, to what audience) ensures that when
musicians draw on their past successes or comfortable routines it is never
ritualized (sedimented coordination). To improvise, in a sense, is to value
risky explorations, to live on the edge of the unknown, to continually
experiment without being paralyzed by the fear of making mistakes. Jazz
players know that the enemy of improvisation is the fear of being wrong.
Within this unpredictable context, what makes such collective creative
achievements possible? Improvisation within a collective is only possible if
participants take a non-critical approach when responding to one another's
contributions. They coordinate action by cultivating an affirmative capacity:
rather than engaging in fault finding or holding one another responsible for
inevitable errors that happen when one is experimenting on the edge of one's
familiarity, each player is committed to sustaining the ongoing dialogue. To
do this, musicians assume that there is an affirmative potential direction in
every interaction and every utterance. They assume that everything that is
happening—even "errors"—makes sense and can be a possible springboard
for an inspired musical idea. Rather than treat an enactment as a mistake to
be avoided, often what jazz musicians do is to repeat it, amplify it, develop it
further until it becomes a new pattern. 'When pianist Don Friedman listened
to a recording he made with trumpeter Booker Little, he realized that he had
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played the wrong chord; Little, however, brilliantly shaped his solo around
the alleged "wrong note."
Little apparently realized the discrepancy during his solo's initial
chorus, when he arrived at this segment and selected the minor third
of the chord for one of the opening pitches of a phrase. Hearing it
clash with the pianist's part. Little improvised a rapid save by
leaping to another pitch and resting, stopping the progress of his
performance. To disguise the error further, he repeated the entire
phrase fragment as if he had initially intended it as a motive, before
extending it into a graceful, ascending melodic arch. From that
point on. Little guided his solo according to a revised map of the
ballad. "Even when Brooker played the melody at the end of the
take," observed Friedman with admiration, he varied it in ways
"that fit the chord I was '^^ ^
Little does not seek to fix blame or search for causes of the mistake but
simply accommodates it as material to be queried for possible direction. Such
a move is affirmative: his utterances contain fragments of Friedman's, making
the "error" sounds intentional in retrospect. Such metonymic reflection grants
validity to the other's offering and leads to transformation, re-direction, and
unprecedented turns. Jazz improvisation assumes that there is aflirmative
potential waiting to be discovered from virtually any utterance.*'^'
There is another, more subtle factor that supports collective
improvisatory breakthroughs. Players agree to interact within a framework
of conjoint relations that are fluid and supple resources for action—namely
the minimal structure known as the song. Songs are socially agreed upon
rules for coordinating dialogue: they contain sections made up of chord
changes that guide choices of scales and melodies that the improviser can
draw upon when exploring an idea. When playing a standard tune such as
"My Funny Valentine" for example, players agree to play within the context
of the C minor chord, followed by the G seventh chord, and so on as the
tune proceeds. These minimal structures serve as a framing device that
orient one another to the repertoire of resources at their disposal as they
negotiate their way through time. It's as if they are all saying to one another,
"let's play from this perspective for this amount of time and see where it
leads." They serve as minimal tacit commonalities that allow participants to
elaborate on simple resources in complex ways. Along the way members are
free to take an idea in a new direction, surprise themselves and others by
defying expectations, trigger others to re-interpret what they have just
heard. This creates a kind of impersonal trust: everyone assumes that the
others are orienting themselves from a particular interpretive perspective for
that bounded period of time.
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Is it possible to find a correlate in social organizational relations—to
create a minimal structure in which participants are free to explore and
discover? If we agree to construct our pattern of relating along the lines of a
song—trusting that others are orienting around a set of minimal constraints,
not holding individuals morally accountable for errors, committed to
sustaining interactive exchanges, taking turns proposing ideas and "comp-
ing" while others develop theirs—perhaps it wilt loosen up sedimented
patterns of coordination that have frozen us in the past and allow freedom
to experiment with a wide repertoire of perspectives.
Consider how this approach relates to an experiment by an
organization in the hotet-management industry. This organization had
been a traditionat bureaucratic structure with authoritarian management
style in which employee and manageriat turnover was unusuatly high and
morale was low. For years inter-departmental conflict and turfism had kept
the departments from creating coordinated strategic direction. The top
management group in particular had a history of conflict. Discussions were
often marred by turfism, bitterness and defensiveness. Members of two
departments in particular were highly suspicious of one another and
discussions often ted to polarized, monologic spirals of indignation and self-
righteousness.
When the General Manager, who had been reading about organiza-
tional change and Total Quality Management, sought to create Total
Quality organization, he knew that the major challenge would be to create a
culture of interdepartmental cooperation and participative management. He
began holding management group meetings with the top twenty managers
to discuss the direction of the hotel. Discussions, as anticipated, often had a
competitive tone and it was very difficult for the group to create cooperative
agreements. Some members refused to speak to one another.
After the managers met for a four day off-site strategic planning
retreat, three task forces were formed to address core strategic issues. One
of the task forces came back to the larger group to propose a strategic
action that would require cooperation of all the warring departments. It
was a plan to nurture employee empowerment and participation
throughout the organization, an action that, if adopted, would radically
challenge the current cultural norms. The subgroup knew that simply
voting on the proposal would not lead to committed action. In fact, voting
would have solidified already warring positions around turf issues.
Further, having debated the idea between themselves for two months,
they knew that there were various sides to the issue that were legitimate
and needed to be addressed. Was there a way to voice these perspectives
without linking them to individual positions who then might feel obliged
to defend their views?
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With the help of a consultant, a strategy was designed to voice
multiple perspectives (various "self expressions") in a way that would not
lead to personality conflicts and would allow members to "play" with
assuming different perspectives rather than escalating commitment to a
position. First the task force spent twenty minutes presenting the proposal.
They could see from watching the body language and raised eye brows of a
few key managers that the old battle lines were emerging. Rather than
simply open the issue up for debate, they structured discussion around
various positions and invited members to gather in groups and speak from
those positions for thirty minutes. They specifically asked that members not
choose the response that they felt most immediately drawn to, but instead
"played" from a different form of self expression thus drawing on their
internal others and group relations.
They set three tables in different comers of the room, each with an
index card that "marked" the various perspectives, like the chord changes of
a song, that members would speak from. The task force leader, presented
the idea:
Obviously this is a big deal. It would represent a major change for
employees and managers if we took this course of action. We want
to talk about the implications of the proposal, but rather than
simply vote on this or ask if you want to do it, we need a chance to
voice all of the perspectives and implications. We have set up three
tables around the corners of the room and we have put index cards
on each. The cards are titled according to the point of view we
would like the subgroups to discuss: (1) support for the proposal;
(2) against the proposal; and (3) concerned about the implications
of this proposal. We would like you to not immediately go to the
corner that best represents your own opinion at the moment. Try
picking a viewpoint that is a stretch for you and surface ideas from
that perspective.
For thirty minutes each of the three groups discussed the proposal and
the discussions were energetic and lively. When the large group came back
together to dialogue about the proposal they were not asked to report what
their groups had discussed, but simply to talk about the proposal. The
ensuing discussion was remarkable in that people did not feel compelled to
defend positions; subgroups traditionally divided were talking more freely
and sometimes found themselves articulating one another's traditional
views. After an hour of dialogue, the group agreed to adopt the proposal for
six month trial basis.
We suggest that one factor that made this dialogue transformative for
this management group was their willingness to improvise within the minimal
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constraints ofthe "song" that the task force created. Participants were willing
to suspend moral judgement based on personal histories or turf protection, to
"comp" and support the development of another's idea with the assumption
that an array of ideas will be legitimately voiced and supported, to assume that
an array of utterances (including those that they might have normally found
repulsive), had the potential to lead somewhere, like a good jazz solo.
CONCLUSION
The present account attempts to cement theory to practice in such a
way as to lend vitality to the former and intelligibihty to the latter. Drawing
from a social constructionist theoretical orientation, and a range of
congenial practices, our concept of transformative dialogue has placed
special stress on relational responsibility, self-expression, affirmation,
coordination, reflexivity, and the co-creation of new realities. Conversa-
tional moves that accomplish these aims seem highly promising; at the same
time there is no attempt here to legislate or draw final conclusions. As
pointed out, cultural forms are many and varied, and undergo continuous
change. Thus, the present is more an attempt to generate a potentially useful
vocabulary rather than a set of marching orders. The account should be
subject to continuous emendation and alteration over time.
Sensitized to possible limitations, it is particularly useful to compare the
present account to other constructionist attempts to treat the problem of
conflicting reahties. Perhaps the most prominent account of this sort is
represented in Pearce and Littlejohn's volume. Moral Comflict.^^^^ Based
largely on constructionist views of discursively constituted realities, they see
the potential for reducing the intensity of conflict through practices of
"transcendent eloquence." In certain respects, then, their criteria
of transcendent eloquence serve the same function as the present account of
the elements of transformative dialogue. For Pearce and Littlejohn, however,
the favored conversational moves are five in number: philosophical (rising
above the immediate payoffs to explore basic assumptions about the real and
the good); comparative (searching for categories that can be used to compare
the otherwise incommensurate perspectives); dialogic (listening attentively
and conversing openly); critical (exploring the potentials and limits of each
side); and transformative (searching for new interpretations of the situation).
In important respects these emphases serve as significant complements to our
account. In the main, Pearce and Littlejohn are concerned with means of
exploring differences in an appreciative way, while we tend to favor means of
moving toward mutuality. In many situations the former project may be a
necessary antecedent to the latter. Yet, while we do favor self-expression (a key
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to exploring differences), we have been more reticent to endorse the intensive
exploration of differences. In part, this is because we believe that talk of
contrasts and comparisons may often function to reify difference and distance.
In this sense, our approach tends to restrict discussions of difference in favor of
conjoining parties in the construction of new alternatives.
We do see our analysis as open to criticism; three such possibilities
deserve special attention. First, we have focused almost exclusively on
discourse, and in doing so lifted it from context and embodiment. The
meaning of any act will obviously depend on its contextual location and its
mode of delivery. Thus, while the present account may be orienting and
inviting, it is not determinative. Extensive immersion in cultural practices
would seem necessary to give these conversational moves their efficacy.
Further, the present analysis is mute with respect to inequality of power. We
have generally treated the interlocutors as equals within the conversational
space. This is not to say that the present analysis is irrelevant to such
conditions. However, at a minimum we are presuming in the present
account that regardless of their power bases, the participants are open to—if
not invested in—possibilities of mutual change.
Finally there is the question of whether, in spite of its claims to the
contrary, the present discussion does not derive from an implicit ethic, a
universal vision of "the good." Is the constructionist orientation, then, no
less parochial and authoritarian than the rationalist/realist positions to
which it is contrasted? To this we must reply that indeed we do enter the
conversation with certain value dispositions—discontent with violent
solutions to difference and desirous of more harmonious relations among
people. However, there is no attempt here either to ground the analysis in
these values, or to justify the practices by virtue of some universal standard
of the good. Rather, constructionism is also a vocabulary without the
privilege of foundations. If others are invested in aims similar to ours, it is
our hope they might find inspiration in these pages.
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